Intersubjectivity refers to sharing the experiences of emotion, perception, and language among more than two participants. Language is not only rooted in our bodies, but also in society and intersubjectivity. The paper shows that, when we explain the cognitive foundation of semantics, cognitive linguistics pursues the principle of individualization, thus failing to resolve the contradiction between embodiment and intersubjectivity. In order to address this research gap, we need to borrow ideas from phenomenology. Zlatev proposed the concept of embodied intersubjectivity, which combines embodiment and intersubjectivity as two complementary aspects of the same phenomenon. According to this point of view, speakers and hearers produce “cognitive coordination” together; in linguistic communication, speakers invite hearers to participate in the inferences evoked by linguistic expression, thus altering the cognitive system of hearers and modulating their common ground accordingly. Normal linguistic usages not only have informative functions, but also have “argumentative” functions. Therefore, speakers can influence others’ minds, attitudes, stances, and spontaneous actions through language. Critical cognitive linguistics reflects intersubjectivity because the former is concerned with linguistic usages and their associated conceptual structures, as well as the ideological and legitimating functions these conceptual structures have in speech situations; in other words, people’s ideologies, stances, ideas, points of view, and the acceptability thereof are affected by language. Critical cognitive linguistics can remedy the omission of sociality and intersubjectivity, and can embody “the social turn” in cognitive linguistics.